German political Orientalists in the era of the First World War thought that new ethnographic methods and insights would allow them to coax Muslim populations throughout the Middle East and South Asia into violent revolt against the British. The European imperial mindset insisted that non-Western peoples could be mastered and masterminded at whim. In fact, German pursuit of absolute control of Asian populations led to their loss of control, as their misrecognitions of the facts on the ground placed them in relationships of mutually-affecting lived encounter with Indian revolutionaries. While these interactions remained largely limited to the realm of military operations during the war, they opened up into ideological encounters on the radical fringes of Weimar society in the war's aftermath. Yet far from a study of humanistic exchange or understanding, this essay seeks to historicize the meetings of Germans and Indian émigrés and show how misrepresentations and power asymmetries were endemic to the encounter between these groups.
Introduction
Ideas about 'Oriental peoples' produced by German politically-engaged Orientalists at the turn of the century set the stage for an unprecedented level of lived encounter with Indian anti-colonial revolutionaries during the First World War. These ideas, however, also generated a severe and ultimately disastrous misrecognition of the Indian population that emigrated to Berlin at the behest of the Foreign Office (Auswä rtiges Amt). Upheaval in India, I show, preoccupied German planners of Weltpolitik from at least 1907 onwards, and persisted as a war aim until the summer of 1915. While the interactions between Germans and Indians remained largely limited to the realm of military operations during the war, unexpected spaces of social and ideological encounter between Germans and the Indian émigré I wish to thank David Blackbourn, Sugata Bose, Peter Gordon and Suzanne Marchand for their comments on earlier versions of this article. population opened up in the war's aftermath, particularly on the radical fringes of German society. Instead of focusing solely on the projections and tropes of German Orientalism, this paper is concerned with the consequences created by its application, as well as with the process by which embodied encounter between once-distant German and Asian populations began to occur. As we shall see, a study of lived encounter challenges the notion of a unilinear relationship of domination of the 'West' against the rest. Instead, power was multi-directional, as Germans became implicated in an international network of Hindu anti-colonial activists. The war was a fateful moment in which Europeans and Asians were clearly making each other's history as never before, through mutual contact and mutual manipulation. Sebastian Conrad and Shalini Randeria have recently pointed out the necessity of attending to the 'mutually-affecting' nature of European contact with the colonial world. 1 This essay adopts such an approach; and yet, to stress the mutuality of lived encounter is not to assert that these meetings were characterized by reciprocity, humanistic exchange or increased understanding. As the historical processes of once-distant peoples became increasingly intertwined over the course of the First World War and in its aftermath, power asymmetries, wilful misrecognition and endemic miscommunication remained. And despite this, what Hans-Georg Gadamer termed the 'historically effected consciousness' of the parties involved, their way of making sense of the world within a historically-specific horizon, had been changed irrevocably through the sharing of physical space, social spheres and ideas. 2 
German political Orientalism and revolution in the East
In July 1914, the eve of the First World War, the Kaiser wrote in the marginalia of a diplomatic report: 'Our consuls in Turkey and India . . . must inflame the whole Mohammedan world to wild revolt . . . for if we are to be bled to death, at least England shall lose India.' Oppenheim, circulated an influential memorandum that prophesied 'the exhaustion of England' when 'Turkey invades Egypt and India rises in rebellion'. 5 India had a spectral presence in German war aims by the beginning of the war and was linked in the official imagination with notions of a massive revolt of the 'Muslim world' through 'jihad'. In order to understand why India became a focus of German war planning in this way in 1914, however, we must return to the turn-of-the-century context, to the moment when the Kaiser embarked on Weltpolitik, and study the conceptual framework in which India began to appear in the German official mind. Lord George Nathaniel Curzon, the just-appointed viceroy of India, wrote to a friend in 1900, 'Germany, to my mind, draws harder bargains than any continental power . . . In international politics never take your eye off the German Emperor.' 6 Indeed, Kaiser
Wilhelm II had recently been behaving badly. In November 1898 he travelled for the second time in nine years to the Ottoman empire, where he demonstrated an 'excessive enthusiasm and exaggerated zeal for everything Turkish and Mohammedan'. 7 He declared himself 'friend' to the '300 million Moslems of the world' at Damascus, and encouraged rumours in the Turkish press that he would convert to Islam. 8 The diplomatic gaffes of the Kaiser, far from unusual for his character, registered German imperial interest in the Middle East at the turn of the century. The Baghdad railway, originally planned as the final link in a land route from Berlin through the Ottoman territories to the Persian Gulf, was the pet project of Marschall von Bieberstein, who became ambassador to Constantinople in 1897. 9 The Baghdad railway formed an important feature of the Kaiser's Weltpolitik, his desire to place Germany definitively on the map of the great European imperialist powers. Scholars of German imperialism have pointed out that the Ottoman empire, China and Africa became the main 'spaces' in which the endgame of German world policy played out. 10 However, Curzon's anxiety about Germany upon his assumption of the Indian viceroyship points to a ghostly preoccupation of German imperialists. India, seen by Germans as the 'glacis' of the British empire and also as its Achilles' heel, preoccupied German planners of Weltpolitik especially from 1907 onwards. That year saw the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian agreement over Persia, a de facto reassertion of the integrity of British-India's frontiers. The agreement was seen by Germans as an expression of British and Russian imperial clout, and as an act of encirclement. 11 In the same period, the conclusion of violent campaigns (1904-7) by German colonial officers against the Herero in Southwest Africa proved that expenditures of vast military resources were incommensurate with the economic benefit, resulting in the loss of support for the Kaiser's colonial policy within the Reichstag in December 1906. The following year, however, liberals and conservatives, sensing they were losing the imperial game, restated their commitment to a new 'rationalized' approach.
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Given this backdrop, official Germany grew increasingly interested in India. Rising anti-colonial nationalist activity in the British colonies in 1907, and particularly in India, caused reverberations at the Foreign Office. As Germans renewed their goal of attaining colonial prowess, the actions of Indian revolutionaries against the British seemed felicitous. The Kaiser, in 1908, made full use of the Indian bogey. 'The British should be aware that war with Germany would mean the loss of India and thus the loss of their world position', 13 he said, words re-echoed in the months before the First World War.
Despite regard for France, Russia, and the United States of America as imperial powers at the turn of the century, the German planetary imagination was informed most by British world hegemony. The period between 1840 and 1900 formed the pinnacle of British imperialism.
14 At the end of the nineteenth century, Great Britain ruled over 10 million square miles of territory and counted roughly 400 million subjects in its colonies. 15 Oppenheim's imagination about India as a zone of revolution took off in 1907 with the rising extremist anti-colonial activity taking place in major Indian cities in that year. In January 1906, Calcutta police began reporting the rise of Hindu extremism. This was the beginning of a radical phase of the Swadeshi (self-sufficiency) movement, spurred by Lord Curzon's partition of Bengal by fiat in 1905. The movement corresponded with unrest elsewhere in India, as violent revolutionary activity picked up in Lahore and Bombay during the same time. The Swadeshi movement in Bengal reached extremist heights in 1907-08 with thirteen assaults and murders of government officials or bystanders, nineteen attempted murders and eleven robberies in the Calcutta region alone. Between 1908 and 1910 a slew of repressive measures were instituted on the All-India level: The Arms Act, the Explosive Substances Act, the Seditious Meetings Act, the Conspiracy Law and the Press Act. Furthermore, many of the prime Indian revolutionaries, most of them Hindu, were deported from India or sent to the dreaded penal colony on the Andaman Islands. 34 This unrest in India was communicated back to the German Foreign Office by consuls in South Asia and the Far East, and Oppenheim interpreted the reports as evidence of rising Muslim fanaticism, even though extremist Hindu activity was really at issue. Here is a clear case of an overwrought Orientalist conceptual framework skewing the ability to apprehend the actual facts on the ground. While Hindu extremism did not fit into Oppenheim's Orientalist perception of the East, Muslim fanaticism did, and thus the facts were altered to fit with fantasy. Oppenheim, informed by German cultural science, saw the whole Orient stretching from Egypt through the Ottoman empire and Persia to India, as a single, monolithic cultural and psychic whole. He conflated the rise of pan-Islamism throughout the Middle East during these same years with the outbreak of Hindu-led nationalism in 
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Hindu nationalism points to the social dominance of 52 One of the main tasks of the Nachrichtenstelle was the production of anti-British propaganda in Middle Eastern and Asian languages: Urdu, Persian, Hindi, Arabic and Chinese. However the propagandistic work was only one aspect of a multi-pronged operation. Until the autumn of 1915, the two most important roles of the Nachrichtentstelle fü r den Orient involved attempts to provide massive amounts of weapons to revolutionaries on India's east coast via Hardayal's Ghadr network based in San Francisco, and a simultaneous campaign to raise revolution throughout the Middle East that would spill into India from the West. By the expenditure of vast amounts of money and the fashioning of intricate conspiratorial strategies, the Foreign Office and an international network of Indian (mostly Hindu) nationalists, attempted to revolutionize India from the East and the West simultaneously.
Germans repeatedly orchestrated major attempts to ship weapons to India via the American Ghadr network. In April 1914, the ship Komagata Maru sailed with German arms and 376 men from San Francisco, but was seized by British authorities once it reached Calcutta. A similar failed attempt was made the following month with the Tosa Maru. The Germans tried again in January 1915, this time with two ships, the Annie Larson and the S.S. Maverick, in a tag-team attempt to transport 'eleven carloads' of arms at a cost of US$140,000 from the coast of Mexico. The Maverick finally entered Indian waters in September after months lost at sea, but was subsequently captured by Dutch authorities As the Germans purveyed Indian revolutionaries on the California coast, they also attempted the same strategy in East Asia. Arrangements were made to provide funds to particular individuals already in Japan and China to purchase weapons on a smaller scale and send them to India. 55 Meanwhile, Jatendra Nath Lahiri, an Indian envoy sent from Berlin, arrived in Bombay and made his way to Calcutta in March 1915, where he informed the Calcutta underground revolutionaries under Jatindra Nath Mukherjee that German arms were on their way. In April, a lieutenant of the Calcutta group, Narendra Nath Bhattacharya, unaware of the shipment fiascos, travelled to Batavia to obtain arms. Returning to Calcutta empty-handed in June, but with optimistic news from the German consul in Jakarta about expected shipments, Bhattacharya and the revolutionary terrorist circle began plans for insurrection in Bengal. He travelled again to Batavia in August 1915 to determine why weapons had not arrived, returning again empty-handed. Later that month Jatindra Nath Mukherjee, the leader of the Calcutta circle, was shot dead by government officials. 56 Soon afterwards, Bhattacharya left India for a third time, again in search of arms, but was instructed on this occasion by the German consul in Peking to travel directly to Berlin to sort matters out with the Foreign Office. 57 The stalling and excuses on the part of German officials point to a general shift away from interest in India in German war strategy by the autumn of 1915. With a series of international high-profile gaffes attributable to the Foreign Office, German representatives in the United States of America were on the defensive. In July 1915, Germans contemplated how best to smooth over the diplomatic tension with America caused by the Annie Larson, Maverick, Djember and Henry S. incidents. 58 In response to evidence of German support for the San Francisco Ghadr, the British Indian government promulgated the Defense of the Realm Act in March 1915, and opened the Lahore Conspiracy Case in which eighty-one Ghadr members were indicted, eighteen convicted and six executed. 59 The trial highlighted German conspiratorial activities in India. One of the ten 'salient features' of Indian conspiracy, remarked the judge as he gave his ruling, was the 'sympathy and admiration for Germans' on the part of Ghadr members and the 
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fact that Ghadr propaganda 'exhorted [Indians] to assist Germany' for 'they have a common enemy [the British]'. 60 While the approach to India was attempted via Hindu anti-colonial networks stretching over the Pacific, the German Foreign Office also simultaneously organized an effort through the overland path to India via the Middle East and Central Asia. As it was already deeply implicated in plots with Hindu revolutionaries, the Foreign Office began to shuttle Indian Hindus to the Middle East to take up the work of stirring up Muslim jihad. In a comical and desperate episode of Orientalism gone wrong, Germans sought to incite fanatical religious fervour in the Muslim 'mind' by the use of Indian Hindu agents.
Whereas there was certainly some degree of collaboration between Indian Muslims and Hindus in the independence struggle of the pre-war years, 61 tensions between these socio-political communities were straining the nationalist movement since the very beginning of Swadeshi from 1905 onwards. Riots broke out in Mymensingh in East Bengal in 1907, for example, as Muslim separatists condemned the economic exploitation of the predominantly Hindu landholders and protested against Hindu cultural arrogance. Hindu nationalist discourse from these years, on the other hand, largely generated by the urban Hindu elites, was marked by anti-Muslim rhetoric, with Muslims often associated with the 'ignorant' agrarian masses. And even where nationalists were not actively antiMuslim, they tended to phrase their struggle in the language of orthodox Hindu religiosity. 62 The German Orientalists' fixation on the Muslim mind, and their desire to portray
Muslims as the leaders of revolution in India, caused them to overlook the significance of these tensions. The Foreign Office envisioned multiple bands of political missionaries, composed of German, Turkish and Indian members, which would infiltrate the Arab territories, Persia and Afghanistan in order to stir up anti-British sentiment and jihad. 63 Three of the most celebrated and high-profile German expeditions during the war years, those of Werner Otto von Hentig, Oskar Ritter von Niedermayer and Wilhelm Wassmuss, 64 all focused on revolutionizing India from the Afghan border. There were a number of other missions active throughout the region, however. 65 While Wassmuss, known as hankering to maintain their monopoly over the contacts and funds flowing from the Foreign Office. Tense relations burst into open conflict in 1915. Heydayat Ahmed Khan complained to German officials that the Berlin Hindus were advancing a culture of promiscuity and worldliness that offended his religious sentiments. 75 Abdul Sattar Kheiri, one of the Indian Muslim leaders in the city, made continuing complaints against the Hindu leadership, and tried to start his own organization. Hindu leaders were successful in convincing the Germans that this would 'offend the unity' of the Indians. 76 Power worked in multiple directions in the tense collaboration between unequally positioned groups during the war. While revolutionizing India had been eliminated as a German war aim by autumn 1915, the Middle East was still a zone of promise for the Foreign Office. Germans were heartened by the victory of the Ottomans over the British at Gallipoli, by the success of German agents in stirring up violent protests against the British in Abyssinia, and in 1916, by the success of the Turko-German military force against the British Indian army at Kut in Iraq. These signs, however, no longer pointed the way to the Punjab, nor signified the impending collapse of the British empire.
By late 1915, Indian agents no longer had the instrumental value they once did for the Foreign Office. And in July 1916, the German consul in Constantinople wrote to Berlin that he was 'against the expenditure of any more money on what is to be regarded as a fantastic utopian scheme'. 77 And Berlin agreed. The new head of the Nachrichtenstelle, Eugen
Mittwoch, notified Bethmann Hollweg soon after that 'it seems wise to end the work in its current form'. 78 The Nachrichtenstelle was given the veneer of an area studies institute to cover up the history of its involvement in German war intrigue.
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By participating in the missions, it must be noted, Hindu nationalists were furthering their own anti-colonial ends. The actions of the German Foreign Office in the first years of the war provided Hindu nationalists with what seemed to be concrete evidence that their struggle could take on world-historical proportions. An article by the 'Indian National Party' in 1916, published from France, exclaimed that 'millions of Orientals to-day are praying for the success and victory of German arms more ardently than the devout Christians prayed for the delivery of Jerusalem'. 80 From New York in 1917, M. N. Roy (the erstwhile Narendra Nath Bhattacharya of Calcutta) wrote, 'the Indian people saw in Germany an ally whose interests were identical and in harmony with her own . . . Germany could be for India what France was for the American colonials'. 81 Indeed, during the course of the war, there was a widespread belief among the mass of ordinary Indians that, contrary to reports from the British, Germans would bring Indian independence on the coat-tails of victory. Underground leaflets circulating in Calcutta pronounced that England was covering up the evidence of its impending defeat. 82 And in Calcutta in 1915, studying German had become a fad among many university students.
Yet the denouement of German-Indian encounter after the First World War was as messy as the collaboration had been during it. Indians who had come to Berlin were now stranded. They were blacklisted by British intelligence and therefore could not travel either westward or back to India. And by 1920, many were still living on stipends provided by the Foreign Office.
83 Some gained employment in the newly founded Deutsches Orient Institut, and some took up advanced university study. Others, still, found work in service jobs, as cooks and waiters, and a few were given funds by the German government to start their own storefronts.
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The Indian diaspora clustered in Charlottenburg in West Berlin, near the offices of the defunct Nachrichtenstelle fü r den Orient, and close to the Technical University. In the immediate aftermath of the First World War, both Indian students and anti-colonial activists flowed from England into the city. The line distinguishing these two groups was blurred, however. Between 1920 and 1923, more than 300 Indians were living in Berlin. 85 The members of the erstwhile Indian Committee now assumed the lead of the émigré community in the early 1920s, organizing pro-nationalist meetings and searching for new sources of financial support.
86
Encounters in radical ideological milieus after the war It remains for us to consider the unintended consequences associated with the establishment of a significant and politically active Indian émigré community in Berlin in the post-war years. While the interactions between Germans and Indians remained largely limited to the realm of military operations during the war, unexpected spaces of mutually-affecting ideological encounter opened up on the radical fringes of German society in the war's aftermath. Here I consider in schematic form the three major milieus of encounter. This is not to suggest that there was no overlap between these diverse arenas, or that they did not, at times, bleed into each other. communism as well. In fact, many of the Indians in Berlin associated themselves with the Communist International in the years after the war's end. The communist world had its own conceptual framework to make sense of modern Asia, a framework that developed from Marx's insistence on the Orient's lack of history with a big 'H' -history towards material 'progress'. As opposed to the neo-romantic realm in which the East was 'guru', within the communist milieu -replicating the claims of Eurocentric nineteenth-century social theory from Hegel to Marx and from Mill to Maine -Asia was pictured in a relationship of tutelage to Europe's experience of modernity. Political events occurring throughout Asia in the early 1920s, particularly in India and China, were covered assiduously by news journals on the left. 93 Communist philosophers were interested in how to train the 'Eastern mind' in the logic of historical materialism. 94 And the Comintern invested extravagantly in institutions meant to build ties with Asian revolutionaries.
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As the communist world became increasingly interested in the East given the demise of realistic prospects for revolution in Europe after the failure of the final German attempt in 1923, anti-colonial Indians were using the increased receptivity of European communism to their own ends. M. N. Roy, who arrived in Berlin in December 1919, insisted in his book India in transition (1922) that India was not a land of spiritual genius, but one of brewing class consciousness. Immediately attracted to the German-Jewish Luxemburgist communist circle, which distinguished itself from the heavy-handed policies of Bolshevism, Roy preached the potential of 'spontaneous revolution' in India -that the workers and peasants there would become a class-for-itself on their own, without Europe's tutelage. 96 As Roy, in conversation with anti-Bolshevik communist thinkers such as August Thalheimer and Karl Korsch, sought to translate Marxist thought so as to preserve its philosophical integrity, while also cleansing it of its Eurocentrism, other Indian leaders proceeded in a different direction. They sought to mould and alter the tenets of Marxist thought to the political imperatives of the Indian nationalist struggle. nationalism. The followers of M.N. Roy, on the other hand, resonating with contemporaneous developments in Western Marxism, asserted that political praxis was not sufficient for liberation, but that cultural critique of Indian society itself was also necessary.] A final space of intense contact between Germans and Indians in the post-war years, and one even more neglected in current scholarship, was the milieu of pan-Germanism. The reasons for pan-Germanists' support of Indian nationalism after the war were threefold: first, as we have already seen, pro-Indian sentiment was a radical expression of Anglophobia; second, and more nuanced, pan-Germanists saw themselves suddenly and dishonourably transposed into the position of a people colonized by Western powers, and this produced a degree of self-identification with colonial struggles; and third, they believed that their ties with Asian peoples constituted a vindicating programme of cultural imperialism, whereby 'German' ideas and Kultur could be spread to the Asiatic world. 98 Conservative journals such as Deutsches Volkstum published anti-colonial articles. 99 Oppenheim, whom we encountered earlier, and Ernst Graf von Reventlow (1869 Reventlow ( -1943 , an anti-republic publicist and early supporter of Hitler, attended the anti-colonial meetings of Indian, Egyptian and Syrian nationalists, just as Hitler himself attended such a meeting in Munich in December 1922. 100 Reventlow was one of the sponsors of the Indian National encounters within the radical milieux of the crisis-ridden Weimar Republic. Hans-Georg Gadamer, in one of his last published writings, remarked that . . . the word 'ecumene' is a Greek expression for the 'inhabited world'. . .. The 'inhabited world' now stretches over the whole planet with the expansion of world travel and the perfection of information technology, and all peoples and cultures have been brought closer together. Given this, we must also inquire into how the centers of gravity within the realm of ideas have shifted. Is that not a philosophical question for our day? 108 Indeed, to speak with Gadamer, an ecumenical approach to the history and function of ideas is certainly of importance today -a mode of investigation that places thought in its lived, 'historically effected', global context.
Kris K. Manjapra is a research affiliate at the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University.
